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MARITIME UNIONS AND
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
Richard L. Clarke
Clemson University

U.S. maritime unions have played a vital historical role in both the defense and the economic
development of the United States. The economic and the political forces that helped shape
and promote the growth of U.S. seafaring labor unions changed dramatically in the 1990s.
Maritime union membership in the United States has fallen by more than 80 per cent since
1950. Inflexible union work rules and high union wage scales have contributed to this decline.
Recent regulatory and industry changes require a new union approach if U. S. maritime
unions are to survive the next decade.

INTRODUCTION
In 1994, America’s two largest ocean carriers,
Sea-Land and American President Line (APL)
applied to the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) for permission to change the country
of registry of several of their largest and newest
container ships from the United States to
foreign, so-called flag of convenience countries.
The CEOs of these two companies joined forces
to argue that unless the federal government took
immediate action to create significant new
operating subsidies, their companies would be
unable to continue to compete with foreign-flag
carriers whose crew costs per month are about
one-third that of U.S. flag carriers.
Organized maritime labor vigorously opposed the
reflagging proposal because it would have
eliminated several hundred union jobs. Since
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
ship owners registering their ships in the United
States have been required to crew their ships
with U.S. citizens who are union members. U.S.
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maritime labor is organized and controlled by 12
major AFL-CIO chartered unions and 18
company-sponsored unions. Over the past 60
years, maritime unions have in large part
controlled crew size and crew costs on vessels of
U.S. registry. The gauntlet laid down by APL
and Sea-Land posed a serious threat to U.S.
maritime labor unions, whose membership has
shrunk significantly from post-WWII levels.
Fortunately for organized labor, the situation
was resolved in their favor when the Clinton
Administration persuaded Sea-Land and APL to
maintain U.S. registry for the ships at issue by
offering a new operating subsidy bill.
In 1996, after years of intensive lobbying by
several different maritime interest groups,
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of
1996. Under this plan, Sea-Land and APL as
well as smaller operators of U.S.-registered deepsea vessels (U.S. flagships) will receive
significant subsidy payments for designated
ships. In exchange, the carriers must pledge to
provide the subsidized ships to the Department

of Defense upon request to support emergency
military sealift needs. The primary beneficiaries
of this law, Sea-Land and APL, subsequently
dropped their request to change the country of
registry for their ships to foreign countries where
ship operating costs are much lower (called
reflagging or flagging out). Sea-land and APLs’
response to the passage of this new maritime
subsidy program preserves what remains of the
U.S. flag deep-sea fleet. The real underlying
issue that motivated their request for reflagging
was not addressed. The real issue is the
continuing high cost of unionized U.S. maritime
labor relative to the rest of the global shipping
industry.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
impact maritime unions have had on the growth
and development of the U.S. Merchant Marine
through their strikes, lobbying efforts and more
recent cooperation with carrier management.
The development and influence of maritime
unions is traced from the Maritime Security Act
of 1915 to the present. The paper briefly reviews
the history of maritime unions then examines
the impact maritime unions have had on the
formation of national policy regarding the U.S.
Merchant Marine. The paper concludes by
considering the implications of the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) and recent
ocean carrier mergers.
HISTORY OF U.S. MARITIME UNIONS
To understand the impact that maritime unions
have had on the U.S. flag shipping industry, it is
necessary to understand the pervasive nature of
U.S. maritime unions in the industry. U.S.
maritime unions include both licensed and
unlicensed seamen on U.S. flag oceangoing
vessels, Great Lakes ships and inland waterway
tugs and barges. There are two longshoremen’s
unions, five unions for shipyard workers, twelve
primary seagoing unions and nineteen
independent labor unions who do business with
individual oil companies (Heine, 1976). Over the
years these unions became very powerful
because they have had the legal right to

determine crew size and composition for
different classes of ships. More importantly,
U.S. maritime unions are empowered to assign
only union members to crew U.S. flag vessels,
determine what they will be paid and how long
they may be at sea. These powers have enabled
the unions to control the variable cost of
oceangoing labor for U.S. flag shipping.
The Strengthening of Maritime Unions
The genesis of U.S. maritime unions can be
traced back to the Seamen’s Act of 1915. This
act established the legal right of maritime
workers to form unions and create standard
work rules for all their members. This act also
ended imprisonment for deserting one’s ship and
established standards for food and quarters
aboard U.S.-flag ships. There is little doubt the
Seamen’s Act of 1915 was vitally needed to
protect crew members from human rights abuses
by powerful shipping companies and
shipmasters.
The rights of maritime workers were further
strengthened by the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. This law, best known for its creation of
operating (ODS) and construction differential
(CDS) subsidies, improved living and working
conditions for maritime labor. It also empowered
labor unions to select only select union members
for crew duty. A year later in 1937, a federal
commission completed a comprehensive review
of the operation practices of U.S.-flag carriers
and maritime labor union management.
This commission found several problems. The
main problems identified by the commission
included interunion friction, union-shipper
conflict, crew inefficiencies and a general lack of
discipline and order aboard ship (Quartel, 1992).
The commission attempted to solve these
problems through a program that included
subsidies to improve onboard living conditions, a
minimum wage for each rating and manning
scales. Federal guidelines were also enacted to
cover overtime pay, maximum time at sea and
vacation time for union members.
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During the 1930s, maritime unions played a
significant role in improving safety, living
conditions, training, pay and compensation of
labor and made the U.S. maritime industry a
much more desirable place to work. As a result,
there was constant supply of skilled seamen
available to operate an increasing number of
U.S. flag vessels and make the U.S. Merchant
Marine a powerful force as the United States
prepared to enter World War II. Following the
conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Merchant
Marine began a long and steady decline in its
size and strength. As shown from U.S. Maritime
Administration data in Table 1, the number of
U.S. seamen sailing aboard U.S. deep-sea vessels
declined more than 80 per cent from 1950 to
1999 (Marad, 1999). This steep decline closely
paralleled the decline in the size of the U. S.
Deep Sea Fleet from 1100 vessels in 1950 to 283
at the beginning of 1999.

shipping and container handling technology and
(4) large seasonal and annual swings in the
demand for ocean transportation. These and
other factors have led U.S shipowners to reflag
more and more of their ships to reduce operating
cost and be more competitive with low cost
shipping offered by foreign lines. These factors
have combined to put increasing pressure on the
already strained relationship between organized
maritime labor and U.S. carriers. The unions
have consistently strived to raise labor rates and
maintain crew sizes while the owners have
continued to eliminate high-cost union jobs by
registering more vessels in foreign countries like
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and more recently
the Marshall Islands.
In 1970, the Nixon
Administration tried to resolve some of these
nagging union-management disputes and
revitalize the U.S maritime industry.
Cooperation for Revitalization

TABLE 1
UNION WORKFORCE, 1950-1999

Jobe

Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Maritime
Labor, Training, and Safety

This decline can be attributed to several external
factors including (1) intense competition from
state-owned and state subsidized foreign
carriers, (2) lack of consistent U.S. maritime
promotion policy, (3) growth of container
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The serious deterioration of the United States
Merchant Marine between 1946 and 1969 caused
in part by union-management disputes led to the
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
The goal of this act was to revitalize the U.S.
merchant marine by promoting the construction
and use of American flag ships.
To accomplish this goal, the Act attempted to
control the high cost of operating U.S. flag ships.
Sea-going wages were indexed and crew size was
to be decided in the ship design phase rather
than negotiated by maritime unions. The act
envisioned 300 new U.S. flag ships would be
built in U.S. shipyards by 1980. Unfortunately,
only 63 new U.S. merchant cargo ships were
built and the Act fell far short of revitalizing the
deteriorating U.S. maritime industry (Whitehurst,
1983).
In 1972, several maritime unions agreed to new
rules aimed at increasing cooperation with U.S.
ship owners. Six seagoing and shoreside unions
agreed to rules aimed at increasing maritime
labor stability and improving the image of the
merchant marine. Irwin Heine (1976) lists the
five major provisions of the agreement:

•

No strike during the period of contract
negotiations.

•

Three to five year contracts to provide
assurance with respect to continuity of
operations.

•

Uniform contract expiration dates.

•

Provision for automatic wage adjustments
annually.

•

Establishment of mechanism or procedure for
the resolution of disputes without stoppages.

These new cooperative policies were formulated
by maritime union leadership to foster a spirit of
cooperation with carrier management; however,
the critical issues of crew sizes and ocean going
pay rates were not addressed.
MARITIME UNIONS AND
MERCHANT MARINE POLICY
Maritime unions have been consistent in their
position on merchant marine policy. Their main
goal has always been to protect the American
maritime labor from foreign competition by
supporting policies and programs that promote
the competitiveness of U.S. flag and U.S.
manned vessel operations.
These include
support of the Jones Act and other policies and
reform proposals, which would make it easier for
U.S. operators to acquire new vessels and
operate them under the U.S. flag.
Maritime unions tend to support policies which
would level out the playing field of international
shipping and reduce the need or desire for
American vessel operators to expand their
foreign flag operations. However, U.S. maritime
unions have often been criticized for supporting
protectionist trade policies. In addition, their
lobbying efforts have raised some concern. The
Seafarers International Union and International

Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots are
represented by lobbying groups on Capital Hillthe Transportation Institute and the Maritime
Institute for Research and Industry
Development, respectively.
While these
“institutes” may appear to be research oriented
organizations, they are primarily lobbying
groups.
The Transportation Department’s
Maritime Administration reimburses subsidized
ship companies for the dues, which are paid to
these “institutes.” In essence, the lobbying
efforts of these big groups are being supported by
taxpayer’s money. Such reimbursement has
been estimated at approximately $2 million per
year (Quartel, 1992).
Lobbying Activities of Maritime Unions
Maritime unions also influence legislation by
making PAC (Political Action Committee)
contributions to members of Congress who have
authority over maritime policy. In 1992, for
example, maritime unions contributed nearly
$500,000 to members of the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee. In the same year, the
Seafarers International Union and the National
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
contributed roughly two million dollars to
members of Congress (Quartel, 1992). Maritime
labor unions lobbied hard to get the Maritime
Policy Reform Act of 1992 passed and signed into
law.
Union leaders laid the foundation for maritime
reform with their support of HR1126 in 1991. The
purpose of this legislation was to require foreign
ships to comply
with the National Labor
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. The
unions supported this proposal because they felt
the extension of U.S. labor laws to foreign flag
ships operating in the U.S. would benefit their
interests. The proposal would help by keeping
foreign flag operators from having the competitive
advantage, which they gained, by not having to
adhere to minimum wage levels and working
conditions. U.S. maritime unions lost this battle
when the bill was defeated in Congress.
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Erosion of Maritime Unions in the Early
1990’s
In 1994, the union representing seagoing
engineers, the Maritime Engineers Benefit
Association (MEBA), agreed to a new labor
contract that reduced union compensation in
exchange for better job security. Under these
new contracts most MEBA members starting
receiving reduced benefits, including lower
overtime pay rates. In 1995, there were several
events that weakened organized maritime labor.
During 1995 several more U.S. owned ships were
flagged out, old U.S. flag freighters were retired
and the movement to repeal the Jones Act gained
wider support. The unions also had their share of
serious internal problems. Perhaps the most
significant was the conviction of five officers of
District I/MEBA for conspiracy mail fraud,
extortion, racketeering, and the theft of $6 million
from union members (Shrock, 1995).
This
conviction gave the FBI and the Department of
Labor the impetus to intensify investigations of
maritime union activities and financing
throughout the U.S.
Other maritime unions were also affected by
internal problems and external economic
pressures in 1995-1997. The National Maritime
Union of America lost some of its member U.S.
flag bulk carriers because of severe unionmanagement conflicts. It is likely that union
problems in the nineties are a result of the poor
financial condition of many U.S. flag operators.
As smaller U.S. flag carriers quit the shipping
business, union membership further declined.
Further problems arose when several union
members under federal investigation filed charges
against their own union president (Shrock, 1995).
The nagging problem of what to do about low cost
foreign flag competition was not resolved during
this period. The differential between U.S. union
sea-going wages and those paid by competing
foreign lines remained a major unionmanagement issue as the decade came to a close.
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SEAGOING WAGES
The issue of U.S. Merchant Marine seagoing
wages versus European, Asian, and flag-ofconvenience crews has been hotly debated for
several years. U.S. labor leaders claim U.S.
seamen are not paid significantly higher wages
than foreign seamen. As evidence they cite higher
rates per ton paid by the Defense Department
during the Persian Gulf war to move military
freight on foreign ships versus the same cargo on
U.S. flag ships (Boggs, 1999).
On the other hand, U.S. ships owmers assert that
U.S. crew costs are much higher for the same
class and size ship. They claim U.S. crew costs
average as much as 2.5 times more than flag-ofconvenience crew costs making it economically
infeasible to use U.S. registry without federal
operating differential subsidies (Whitehurst,
1996). Two recent pay studies offer new evidence
to support the agreement raised by U.S. ship
owners.
Published sources from the U.S. Maritime
Administration and the International Transport
Workers Federation reported comparative average
crew costs associated with operating an
equivalent size container ship for one month
(Whitehurst. 1996). These costs in U.S. dollars
are compared in Table 2.

TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE CREW COST FOR A
CONTAINERSHIP BY REGISTRY
(U.S. $)
European

Asian

United States

$80,000

$95,000

$340,000

Source:

Whitehurst (1996). Original source
cited in the article was the Maritime
Administration, “Competitive Manning
of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of
the Maritime Administration, 1995.

A recent breakdown by crew position done by
Whitehurst also shows U.S. crew costs are
significantly higher than European, Asian, or flagof-convenience crew costs (1996) (See Table 3).
It should be noted that the International
Transport Federation (ITF) wage scales apply to
the highest paid 20 percent of flag-of-convenience
vessels. Reliable data on the lowest paid foreign
crews is unavailable, but it is widely believed that
non-ITF crews are paid significantly less that ITF
crews. U. S. maritime unions have dealt with the
pay disparity by lobbying Congress to enact
protectionist legislation that mandates the use of
U. S. ships and U.S. seamen. The most recent
such legislation is the Merchant Marine Act of
1996.
IMPACT OF THE
MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996
As the need to deploy a very large U.S. military
force to the Persian Gulf started to grow in early
1990, maritime labor found a strong ally in the
Defense Department. When President Bush
decided to send military forces to the Persian Gulf
in August of 1990, the U.S. Merchant Marine was
not capable of supplying enough ships or crewmen
to get the job done. The administration was
forced to request merchant shipping support from
its NATO allies. Fortunately, several allies that

supported the policy of military intervention in
the Persian Gulf had sufficient sealift capability
to help and the will to do so. Foreign carriers like
Maersk of Denmark made their ships available to
the U.S. Defense Department. By the time the
deployment (Operation DESERT SHIELD) was
completed, more than 60% of the merchant sealift
of U.S. military supplies and equipment to the
Persian Gulf had been provided by foreign-flag
ships (Pagonis, 1992).
Operation DESERT
SHIELD highlighted the shortage of U.S. cargo
ships and U. S. civilian crewmen and greatly
helped the unions put pressure on Congress to
provide new operating subsidies to guarantee the
future availability of U.S.-flag ships. Five years
after Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait,
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of
1996.
Eight major unions that fought hard for this new
subsidy bill were the International
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union,
International Organization of Masters, Mates
and Pilots, Maritime Firemen’s Union, Sailors’
Union, Sailors’ Union of Pacific, National Marine
Engineers Beneficial Association, Seafarers
International Union, and American Maritime
Officers. Union leaders emphasized the benefits
of this act on the U.S. economy, employment
rate, and national defense capabilities.

TABLE 3
MONTHLY SEAGOING WAGES (U.S. $)
ITF
European
Asian
Position
U.S. Flag
$9,697
$4,331
Master
$32,653
$2,884
18,727
2nd Officer
7,036
1,979
1,491
Radio Officer
15,142
5,475
2,874
1,491
1st Engineer
23,229
8,425
2,796
1,862
2nd Engineer
18,848
7,845
1,979
1,491
7,619
Chief Steward
9,053
1,491
2,118
Able Seaman
6,022
4,510
1,610
856
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source cited in the article was the Maritime Administration,
“Competitive Manning of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of the Maritime Administration,
1995.
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The new law answers the challenge laid down by
Sea-land and American President Lines, at least
for the near-term. It established the Maritime
Security Program (MSP) with new operating
subsidies for 47 militarily-useful U.S. flag ships
over a 10-year period (1996-2005). The owners of
each ship will receive approximately $2.1 million
per ship per year. In return the owners pledge to
maintain U.S. registry and, of course, U.S. crews
on these designated ships.
The Maritime
Security Act of 1996 provides the ship owners
and the labor unions with the first significant
maritime subsidy program since the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970. This Act is designed to
protect U.S. merchant marine jobs, improve
national defense sealift capability and insure a
U.S. flag presence in international shipping
through 2005.
However, recent U.S. ocean
shipping regulatory reform and industry
consolidation may have already diluted the
beneficial impact unions hoped for.
Recent Ocean Carrier Consolidation
In 1999, Denmark’s A.P. Moller, the parent
company of Maersk, purchased the international
division of Sea-Land Services, Inc. This recent
takeover of the largest U.S.-flag carrier follows
the 1997 takeover of American President Line
(APL) by Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) of
Singapore and the 1997 CP Ships (Canadian)
takeover of Lykes, the third largest U.S. ocean
carrier (Beargie, 1999). These mergers have
placed 31 (3 Lykes ships, 9 APL ships and 19 SeaLand/Maersk ships) of the 47 total MSP vessels
under foreign control (Damas, 1999).
For the time being these 31 vessels continue to be
manned by U.S. union seamen. When the MSP
comes up for renewal in 2005, the issue of foreign
ownership may force Congress to find other
alternatives for defense sealift. While it is too
soon to identify all the likely alternatives, it
seems clear the protection of U. S. seafaring jobs
provided by the 1996 Maritime Security Act will
cease in six years or less. Recent U.S. ocean
shipping reform also appears to be having a
detrimental impact on U.S. seafaring labor.
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Impact of U.S. Ocean Shipping Regulatory
Reform
On May 1, 1999, the U.S. Ocean Shipping Reform
Act (ORSA) became effective. This new law
significantly reduces regulatory control of ocean
transportation by the U.S. and encourages
carriers to become more competitive. A major
provision of the new law allows carriers to
negotiate confidential service agreements with
U.S. shippers and importers. Many foreign
carriers have already taken steps to reduce their
operating costs so they can attract new business
by offering lower rates. The general impact on
most sectors of the U.S. economy should be
positive since increased competition usually
fosters better service and lower transportation
cost, which in turn can lower the price of
consumer goods. One sector, which will likely feel
a negative impact, is organized maritime labor. A
less regulated carrier industry will likely force
U.S. ship owners to rely even more heavily on
lower cost foreign crews resulting in a further
decline in U.S. seagoing union labor.
CONCLUSION
Maritime unions have had significant influence on
the United States Merchant Marine. From the
Seamen’s Act of 1915 to the Maritime Security
Act of 1996, maritime unions have helped shape
U.S. maritime policy and have provided high
paying jobs for their members. Maritime unions
have also supplied the manpower necessary for
the sealift of military supplies and equipment in
times of war and national emergency. Most
recently, U.S. merchants ships and U.S. merchant
seamen contributed significantly to the success of
Operation Desert Storm / Shield. However, there
is legitimate concern for the vitality of the U.S.
Merchant Marine in the future.
The recent trend in the global ocean carrier
industry toward consolidation and rationalization
will likely continue. As large foreign carriers like
Maersk and Neptune Orient Lines gain control of
an increasing number of U.S. registered ships,
more union jobs will be lost. Ocean shipping has
become more competitive and shipowners must

operate as efficiently as possible. When the
subsidies guaranteed by the Maritime Security
Act of 1996 expire in 2005, ship owners will find
it difficult to justify the continued use of U.S.
union seamen. While Congress and the maritime
special interests groups debate future political
options to find another temporary fix, it seems a
permanent solution may rest on what the unions
do.
It is clear that owners/operators of U.S. flag ships
want maritime unions to reduce wage rates, crew

sizes, and change other union work rules to lower
operating cost. The renewal of operating sub
sidies for national defense sealift provided by the
Maritime Security Act of 1996 offers U.S. flag
operators and American maritime unions a small
window for finding a permanent solution to
operating cost issues. Perhaps, if both sides now
focus on their mutual interests rather than on
long-held positions over pay and crew size issues,
a lasting solution can be found before the new
subsidy program terminates in 2005.
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